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Secularism and Islam: 
The Building of Modern Turkey
Binnaz Toprak
I. Introduction
Turkey has a unique position in the Muslim world. It is the only 
secular democracy among Muslim majority countries. The foundations 
for its secularism were laid in the first decade following the establish-
ment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The roots of the secular move-
ment go back to the mid-nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire 
began to modernize. Its democracy is now more than half a century 
old. The republic was ruled by a single party between 1923 and 1946. 
The first competitive elections were held in 1946. Since then, Turkey 
has been struggling to consolidate its democracy. The democratic pro-
cess was cut short for brief periods after the 1960 and 1980 military 
coups when military regimes were established. In addition, democrati-
cally elected governments were twice ousted by military interventions 
in 1971 and 1997. Nevertheless, despite these setbacks, democracy in 
Turkey has become institutionalized and the likelihood of yet another 
military coup, or even an intervention, seems out of the question.
Since the 1997 military intervention, Turkey has engaged in a sub-
stantial effort to further liberalize its political system in order to meet 
the criteria set forth by the European Union (EU), to which Turkey 
has applied for membership. Surveys show that about 80 percent of 
the Turkish population support EU membership, a figure that is a 
major motor behind government initiatives to reform the system to 
conform with EU demands. In December 2004, the European Union set 
a definite date to start negotiations on Turkey’s membership. If Turkey 
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becomes a member of the EU within the next decade or so, this will be 
a success story for Turkey’s secular road to democracy and modernity. 
Indeed, the Turkish case has been drawing greater attention by West-
ern policy analysts as a “model,” or an “example,” for the rest of the 
Muslim world.
This essay outlines the changes Turkey underwent in its transition 
from empire to nation-state in terms of its experiment with secular-
ism and democracy. It especially looks at the tension between secular-
ism and Islam, showing how this tension was originally contained by 
authoritarian measures during the early years of the republic but was 
later transformed into a major issue of democratic politics. The man-
ner in which the strained relationship between secularist and Islamist 
politics was played out in the democratic arena and the outcome of this 
power struggle have no parallel in the Muslim world. This experience 
shows that the road to Turkish modernity was a long but continuous 
process and that the outcome is a result of the complex interplay of 
indigenous social and political actors, on the one hand, and interna-
tional influence, on the other.
II. The Ottoman Background
The Turkish Republic is the heir to the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman rule 
lasted for 600 years. It was a multi-ethnic empire with 75 different 
ethnic groups living within its borders. It was also a multi-religious 
empire with large populations of Muslims, Jews, and Christians of var-
ious denominations. Its founders were Muslim Turks and the adminis-
tration of the empire was a semi-theocracy. Although Islamic law was 
the basis of political rule, this coexisted with the secular decrees of the 
sultans in administrative matters. The Ottoman system of administra-
tion recognized the multi-religious composition of the population and 
was accordingly organized around the concept of Millets, or religious 
communities. Each Millet was subject to its own religious law in per-
sonal status issues and was given autonomy in its internal affairs con-
cerning the community. This system of administration was relatively 
successful in keeping peace within the borders of the empire until the 
advent of nationalism in the 19th century.
The need for reform in the Ottoman Empire was first recognized 
as a result of failures in various military campaigns. At the height of 
its power in the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire ruled over lands 
in the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe. It was a “super-
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power” of the period. The Ottomans gradually lost their military supe-
riority as science, industry, and technology developed in Europe. Like 
other great empires, such as the Chinese, Russian, or Japanese, the 
Ottomans, too, tried to reverse the decline by a concerted effort at 
Westernization. The mid-19th century witnessed large-scale reforms in 
administration, education, and law that culminated in a constitutional 
movement towards the end of the century. However, these were insuf-
ficient in preventing the disintegration of the empire. By the beginning 
of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire was considered to be the “sick 
man of Europe” by the European powers, which sought to divide its 
lands among themselves after the empire’s final collapse.
The empire fought on several fronts in the late 19th century to stop 
its disintegration but continued to lose much of its lands in the Balkans 
and the Middle East as a result of nationalist movements. Its final col-
lapse came at the end of World War I. Defeat in the war was accompa-
nied by the occupation by Western powers of what had remained in its 
hands, namely, the land area that approximately makes up the present 
borders of the Turkish Republic. After a nationalist struggle that ended 
the occupation, and a brief civil war between the nationalists and the 
Ottoman dynasty, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed in 1923.
The collective memory of having once been a “superpower” that 
was now considered to be “sick” gave way to a torturous process of 
soul-searching among Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. Ottoman opinion was divided into two 
camps about the route to be followed in order to “catch up” with the 
West. The first camp, the Islamists, argued that the reasons for decline 
had to be sought in the Westernization reforms that started in the mid-
19th century. Instead of simply appropriating Western industry and 
technology, which they agreed had to be imported into the empire, 
Ottoman reformists had opted to adopt Western institutions and cul-
tural forms. This created a nation of “imitation men” in an “imitation 
world” that could be no panacea for the problems that the empire 
faced. In the view of the Islamists, the Ottomans had built a great 
Islamic civilization that was in no need of reform. On the contrary, they 
thought that the decline of the empire accelerated when it began to 
lose its mission as an Islamic state and chose to “ape” the West.
The Westernists, on the other hand, argued that Western science, 
industry, and technology were closely related with institutional struc-
tures. One could not simply take one and leave the other. If the empire 
were to modernize, it would do so by adopting a comprehensive pro-
gram of Westernization.
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It was the second camp, the Westernists, who won the debate upon 
the establishment of the republic. For the republican cadres, modern-
ization meant Westernization. The new republic had to undergo radi-
cal changes in order to be included among what the founding fathers 
of the republic considered to be the “civilized nations” of the West. 
This soul-searching drama was picked up later, after the advent of 
democracy in 1946, and gained further momentum in the 1980s and 
1990s as Turkish politics and the public increasingly became divided 
into “Islamist” versus “secularist” camps. It is the unfolding of this 
drama that the rest of this essay will address.
III. The Secularization Program of the Early Republican Years
For the founding fathers of the republic, cultural change was the key 
to Turkey’s modernization. These men had been educated in the sec-
ular military academies of the late Ottoman Empire and were very 
much influenced by the Enlightenment ideas of science and progress 
that entered the empire through the Young Ottoman and Young Turk 
movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is rumored, for 
example, that Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), the founder of the Turkish 
Republic and its first president, kept Rousseau’s books at his bedside. 
Indeed, two hundred pages were devoted to the French Revolution in 
the Ottoman secondary school textbooks of the early 20th century.
For Mustafa Kemal and his associates, the role of Islam in Ottoman 
society and politics was responsible for the failure to modernize. In 
their view, Islamic teaching and codes of behavior had kept Muslim 
women outside the public sphere, and the ulema (learned men of reli-
gion) had played a key role in the opposition to all forms of reform 
and progress in the empire. Hence, the new republic would undertake 
a series of reforms both to emancipate the women and to destroy the 
influence of Islam in education, law, and public administration. At the 
same time, all religious brotherhoods of unorthodox Islam, the folk 
Islam—which they found to be the force behind the popular ignorance 
of rational thought—had to be banned in the effort to create a new 
nation of men and women who would be guided by positivist ideas of 
reason.
To this end, the republic undertook a series of legal reforms. The 
Shariat (Islamic law) was abolished and in its place new civil and crimi-
nal codes were accepted. On the bases of these, women were given equal 
rights with men in matters of marriage, divorce, custody over children, 
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and inheritance. Polygamy was outlawed. The veil was banned for 
women who were government employees and it was discouraged for 
the rest. Later, in the early 1930s, women received the right to vote and 
stand for office. At the same time, compulsory primary school educa-
tion became mandatory for both sexes and all state schools, including 
high schools and universities, became co-educational. Similarly, Islamic 
principles in criminal law gave way to secular codes. At the same time, 
the republic opened career opportunities for women. As early as the 
1930s, women were employed in prestigious jobs hitherto reserved for 
men. Large numbers of women became judges, lawyers, doctors, and 
university professors, the counterparts of which were mostly unknown 
in the West. Even today, there are more women professors in Turkish 
academia than, for example, in Germany.
However, it should be added that these early reforms for the eman-
cipation of women were not built upon by successive governments 
after the end of the single-party period. With the advent of democracy, 
politicians seemed content with what Turkish women had already 
achieved, and the issues of women’s rights and problems receded into 
the political background. Since the 1980s, a vocal and organized wom-
en’s movement has been quite effective in raising consciousness and 
forcing governments to enact new legislation or amend the old. Nev-
ertheless, despite the exemplary earlier record, Turkey scores poorly in 
international statistics on gender equality and empowerment as com-
pared to Western countries. The literacy rate is lower, women’s partici-
pation in the labor force is unsatisfactory, women politicians are rare 
(with an embarrassing 4.4% in the present parliament), and women 
seem to hit a “glass ceiling” when it comes to top administrative posi-
tions. At the same time, women continue to be the victims of domestic 
violence, sexual harassment in the workplace (a recent survey found 
14% of the population reporting that they “knew” a woman who suf-
fered it), and honor killings. However, the same survey showed that 
there is overwhelming public support to alleviate these and other 
problems concerning gender roles.1
The early reforms of the republic also targeted the role of Islam 
in politics and administration. The Caliphate, an important institu-
tion that symbolized the unity of all Muslims in the world, was abol-
ished. All religious schools were banned and the educational system 
was unified under a Ministry of Education. Orthodox Islam was put 
under state control through the creation of a Directorate of Religious 
Affairs. Tied to the office of the prime minister, its personnel serving 
Macalester International  Vol. 15
32
in the mosques became paid employees of the state to be controlled, 
watched, and used to back up government decisions.2 In addition, the 
Sufi brotherhoods that represented unorthodox practices within Islam 
were outlawed.
At the same time, republican constitutions, the criminal code, leg-
islation on parties, labor unions, and associations all included arti-
cles that banned the use of religion for political purposes or personal 
gain. On the basis of these articles, a number of parties were closed 
down and individuals were given prison sentences for activity that the 
state considered dangerous to the foundations of the secular republic. 
Although some of this legislation has recently been relaxed, it is still 
illegal for any political party, association, or individual to advocate the 
establishment of an Islamic state.
It was also during the early republican years that symbolic measures 
were undertaken to reduce the influence of Islam in Turkish society. For 
example, the weekly holiday was changed from Friday, the day of rest 
for Muslims around the world, to Sunday. The calendar changed from 
the Muslim lunar to the Gregorian. The Arabic alphabet was changed 
to the Latin, which meant lack of access by the new generations to 
Islamic/Ottoman sources. The language itself changed as vocabulary 
and grammatical forms borrowed from Persian and Arabic (that had 
heavily influenced literary Ottoman Turkish) were eliminated.
These and a host of other minor changes added up to a radical rup-
ture with the Islamic past. The republic’s understanding of secularism 
was, and to a large extent still is, closer to the French understanding of 
laïcism than to the Anglo-Saxon experience with secularism. The new 
republican elite consisted of men and women who might be religious 
in their personal lives but who refrained from any display of their 
religious belief as actors in the public sphere. Overtly religious people 
were not accepted into the political, social, or intellectual elite circles.3 
The republic marginalized them, caricaturized them as fanatics, and 
considered them uncivilized. It was these marginalized groups that 
later formed the backbone of political Islam.
These reforms were undoubtedly from the top down and imposed 
by a single-party regime. In the 1920s and the 1930s, the new republic 
confronted a number of rebellions, some of which were instigated by 
Islamist groups. These were suppressed by force. However, compared 
to other revolutions such as the French, Russian, or Chinese, the Turk-
ish revolution did not involve massive bloodshed. Nevertheless, the 
severe measures undertaken, such as death sentences to the leadership 
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of these rebellions, pushed the Islamist opposition underground. When 
it re-emerged after 1950 with the advent of democracy, the nature of 
the opposition had already changed from direct armed conflict to chal-
lenging the system through party politics.
Although the early republican reforms were originally forced on 
the majority of the population, they eventually came to be accepted. A 
survey in 1999 found that an overwhelming majority (77.3%) of Turk-
ish citizens believe that the early republican reforms have led to Tur-
key’s progress. Only 8.3% think otherwise. In addition, 60.6% do not 
approve of religious parties.4 More importantly, support for the estab-
lishment of an Islamic state based on Islamic law has remained around 
10%. Although 21.2% in 1999 supported an Islamic state,5 answers to 
other questions, such as the replacement of the secular civic code with 
Islamic law, showed that this percentage is reduced to around 10% 
when specifics are at issue. The percentage of those who support Mus-
lim criminal law is almost negligible, with only 1.2% favoring recm, 
stoning to death for adultery.
IV. The Advent of Democracy and of Political Islam
Although the first competitive elections in Turkey were held in 1946, 
there was widespread suspicion about its results. The same party 
(Republican People’s Party, RPP) of the single-party years won the 
elections against the Democrat Party (DP) of the opposition. There 
were rumors that the election results were rigged. The first change of 
government was four years later, following the 1950 elections, when 
the Democrats came to power with an overwhelming majority of the 
votes.
There had been two attempts earlier, first in 1924 and the second in 
1930, to allow political competition. However, these were short-lived 
and the opposition parties that were established were closed down 
by the single-party regime on the grounds that they had encouraged 
the Islamist opposition. The final change of regime from authoritar-
ian single-party rule to democracy in 1946 came about partially at the 
insistence of the United States that Turkey accept democratic rule as 
a condition for membership in the newly founded United Nations. 
Foreign encouragement was to play a significant role years later when 
successive Turkish governments in the 1990s and early 2000s had to 
take a series of measures to liberalize and consolidate the democratic 
system in Turkey at the insistence of the European Union.
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The Turkish case is a good example of how international encourage-
ment and pressure can democratize the system. However, it would be 
erroneous to attribute Turkey’s democratization solely to the impact 
of this single factor. The more important factors are Turkey’s historical 
legacy and the internal changes within the system itself. These include 
the state tradition of self-rule inherited from the Ottoman system; the 
already developed bureaucracy that increasingly functioned on merit 
and written rules; the existence of a codified system of law that culmi-
nated in the recognition of universal citizenship rights after the estab-
lishment of the republic; the proximity to Europe and the entry of 
Enlightenment ideas; the previous experience with constitutionalism 
in the last half century of the empire; the republican program of secu-
larization; the emancipation of women; the emphasis on socialization 
through education; the changes in the class structure; and the economy. 
All these factors played a role in the transition.
The issue of secularism was one of the major topics of the election 
campaign in 1950. Already in 1946, the Democrat Party had established 
itself as the center of political opposition to the republican understand-
ing of secularism. The Democrats promised changes in this under-
standing. In the first month after they came to power, they began to 
implement some of these changes. For example, devout Muslims who 
wanted to make the pilgrimage to Mecca were allowed to make trans-
fer of Turkish liras to foreign exchange; the call to prayer (ezan) was 
permitted in its original Arabic version; the tombs of holy saints were 
reopened for visits; the state radio could now broadcast prayers during 
religious holidays; the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
was increased; and a number of religious schools and one program at 
the university level were opened to train religious personnel. All this 
activity had been restricted or banned during the single-party years.
These changes led to intense debate in Turkey between groups who 
wanted greater exercise of their faith and those who saw such change as 
a dangerous threat to the secular foundations of the republic. Andrew 
Mango, a British scholar of Turkish politics, wrote in 1967 that readers 
of the Turkish press could get the impression that politics in Turkey 
was about religion.6 Indeed, much was written by both Turkish and 
foreign observers at the time about the “resurgence” or the “revival” of 
religion in Turkey.
The politicization of this issue and the division of the electorate into 
two “camps” has continued to this day. Issues that might seem unim-
portant or even absurd to foreign observers flare up in Turkey from 
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time to time over the question of secularism and its limits. For exam-
ple, a coalition government in the late 1970s, in which an Islamist party 
was a participant, implemented a new regulation that required a liquor 
permit for the sale of beer. This decision occupied newspaper head-
lines for weeks as a major assault on the secular state. Similarly, the 
controversy over whether or not a mosque could be built on the Tak-
sim square in Istanbul, considered to be the center of the city, became a 
symbol of the tug-of-war between the “Islamists” and the “secularists” 
throughout the 1980s. The ban on headscarves for women university 
students, over which there were sit-ins and demonstrations in front of 
university gates for years, remains an unresolved issue.
The sensitivity over secularism can seem excessive at times. How-
ever, it is not totally groundless either. For one thing, examples of 
Islamic states that have resorted to extreme repression, such as Iran, 
Afghanistan under the Taliban, or the Saudi regime, feed the public 
paranoia about political Islam. Second, there have been cases of vio-
lence against known atheists or public critics of political Islam. The 
most notorious of these was mob involvement in the 1990s in setting 
fire to a hotel where a famous atheist writer and other intellectuals 
were staying. The incident claimed 35 lives. A university professor and 
a number of journalists known for their critical outlook on Islam were 
assassinated in the 1980s. Mass graves of victims tortured by the Turk-
ish Hizballah were discovered in the 1990s. Added to these were less 
important but nevertheless worrisome demands and/or decisions by 
Islamist groups and power holders. For example, the Minister of Edu-
cation from the Islamist party in the 1970s proposed banning Darwin’s 
teachings at secondary schools. A mayor from the Islamist party, again 
in the 1970s, proposed sex-segregated city buses. Another fined an 
individual who publicly ate during the fasting month of Ramadan. A 
university student was killed on campus by a fellow student for doing 
the same. Islamist students at medical faculties were demanding that 
cadavers in anatomy lessons be dressed in briefs, panties, and bras. 
The leader of the Islamist party in the 1990s even talked about com-
ing to power “by blood, if need be.” His party’s program proposed to 
change the legal system from that of universal law for all citizens to a 
“multiple system” based on religious membership, which, in effect, 
would have meant the application of Islamic law for Muslims.
As the Islamic movement gained strength in the late 1980s and the 
1990s, the polarization of the electorate reached its peak. A report in 
a weekly news journal, Nokta, demonstrated the extent of this polar-
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ization. Two young women working for the journal reported on an 
experiment they had conducted. First, they dressed in mini-skirts and 
went to a movie theater in a religiously conservative area of Istanbul. 
The audience inside the theater was segregated by sex in terms of the 
seating arrangement and the women were covered. During the inter-
mission, the journalists were circled by angry young men who ques-
tioned their intentions, as a result of which they felt threatened and 
left. Alternatively, they appeared in black veils in a nightclub and were 
asked to leave the premises, this time having been forcefully thrown 
out by bodyguards after having refused to do so. Their report dem-
onstrated that it had become difficult for these two camps to share the 
same public space.
Although this polarization continues to some extent, attitudes seem 
to have shifted as a result of changes in the Islamic movement itself. 
A 1999 survey showed that for the majority of the Turks, this kind of 
intolerance is not the case. According to its results, 91.5% find toler-
ance of differences of faith to be important for social peace. On ques-
tions about whether believers would be considered Muslims even if 
they did not conform to an Islamic way of life—such as performing 
the daily namaz, fasting during Ramadan, refraining from alcohol, or 
wearing headscarves as women—an overwhelming majority (around 
85% for each, except for the 67% on the question of alcohol) answered 
in the affirmative. A surprising 53.1% said that there might be good 
people among the atheists. Eighty-six percent said that they would eat 
in a restaurant in which the majority of the women were covered while 
83.5% said that they would not mind if the majority of the women in 
their neighborhood were covered. A full 66.3% said that they would not 
be bothered if the majority of the women in their neighborhood wore 
mini-skirts. And 56.2% considered it acceptable for covered women to 
wear make-up.
Over the years, the composition of these two camps has changed. 
In general, those who have kept a “vigil” over the secular state have 
been the most distinguished groups in Turkish society: intellectuals, 
academia, the judiciary, the mainstream press, the business commu-
nity, the army, and the educated middle classes. However, there have 
been changes in the attitudes of these groups in recent years as many 
have adopted more liberal attitudes toward Islamist sensibilities. The 
Islamists, on the other hand, are no longer made up of marginal groups 
in society. They have integrated themselves into the centers of political 
power, economic wealth, social status, and intellectual prestige. This 
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has largely been a result of the challenge to the secular elites of the 
republic by Islamist political parties and the movement at large.
V. Democratic Politics and the Changing Nature of Political Islam
The transition to democracy in Turkey had important consequences 
in terms of the struggle between the secularists and the Islamists. The 
logic of revolutionary politics was replaced with the logic of demo-
cratic politics. This required that post-1950 governments had to take 
into account the demands of both sides. The religious versus the secu-
lar sensibilities of the voter had to be balanced. The power struggle 
between these two camps was carried out within democratic processes 
and was peaceful. Hence, Turkey has never been in serious danger of 
a change of regime from a secular-democratic to an Islamic state. The 
Islamist movement in Turkey has been moderate and has not been 
associated with the kind of violence that exists among similar move-
ments in the region.
Several factors contributed to the moderate politics of the Islamist 
movement in Turkey. First, the role of the military has been decisive. 
It sees itself as the guardian of the secular republic and interferes in 
the political process when it perceives a threat to the secular, unitary 
foundations of the republic. It has been the major force in controlling 
the power of the Islamist movement, as it has of other movements that 
the generals found threatening to the regime. This self-appointed role 
as “guardian” is under scrutiny. Reducing the role of the military in 
politics has been on the agenda of recent governments in Turkey and 
legal changes to that end are demanded by the European Union for 
Turkish membership.
The second factor is the role of the judiciary and the legal system. 
The secular state is protected by an article in the Constitution not sub-
ject to amendment. As mentioned earlier, there are legal restrictions 
on the use of religion for political purposes. Some of this legislation 
has been amended in recent years to allow greater freedom of speech 
and association. Nevertheless, the judiciary has been particularly on 
the watch. The offices of the Attorney General and the Constitutional 
Court have used their power to limit the activity of Islamist organiza-
tions and political parties.
A third factor is public commitment to the secular state. Over the 
years, important groups within Turkish society and a large middle 
class have been very sensitive on the question of secularism. Surveys 
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show that the majority of the population opposes the politicization of 
religion and the granting of a role for Islam in state affairs.
Fourth, Islamists were integrated into centers of power through the 
democratic process. This has been the most important factor in mod-
erating the Islamist movement. In this context, it is useful to look at its 
evolution and see by what means a movement that turned radical in so 
many other regions was contained within a democratic regime.
When Turkey made the transition to democracy in 1946, twenty-
four political parties were founded with the aim of challenging the 
incumbent party in the coming elections. Of these, the programs of 
eight emphasized issues of secularism versus Islam. The political cli-
mate at the time seemed conducive to the electoral success of any party 
that popularized the issue. It was known that there was widespread 
opposition to the radical program of secularization that the Republican 
People’s Party (RPP) had put into effect throughout the single-party 
years. However, seven of these had already closed their doors within 
four years. The remaining one received a single seat in the Grand 
National Assembly following the 1950 elections. The Islamist vote went 
to the Democrat Party, which combined a new economic program with 
promises to relax the secularization program of the RPP. An explicitly 
religious party was established only in the early 1970s. By then, it had 
become clear that economic policy was much more important for the 
electorate than concerns over religious issues.
The National Salvation Party (NSP), under Necmettin Erbakan’s 
leadership, was relatively successful at the polls in the 1970s. It was 
a coalition partner in several governments of the period. Its success 
rested on its recognition that meeting the everyday needs of the elec-
torate had priority for electoral success. The NSP’s program empha-
sized rapid industrialization. On the one hand, the party appealed to 
the Anatolian entrepreneurs with conservative and provincial back-
grounds. On the other hand, it appealed to the poor with its promises 
of cutting down inflation and providing social welfare. Islamic themes 
were of secondary importance for the party’s declared goal of eco-
nomic growth.
The National Salvation Party was closed by the military after the 
1980 coup. In 1983, when the generals handed power back over to civil-
ian governments, the Welfare Party (WP) was founded, again under 
Erbakan’s leadership. The WP of the 1980s and the 1990s, like the 
National Salvation Party of the 1970s, based its strategy on answering 
the needs of the electorate. It was exceptionally active at the grassroots 
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level. Party activists performed wide-ranging community services that 
delivered help to the urban poor. The party also became a channel for 
social mobility. This led to success in the municipal elections of 1994 
when Welfare candidates for mayor won in 28 municipalities. A year 
later, following the 1995 elections, the Welfare Party came to power 
in a coalition government. The Welfare Party had received the highest 
percentage of votes. Hence, the job of forming the government was 
given to the Welfare leader, Erbakan, who became the prime minister 
in 1996.
The decline of the Left after 1980 was one of the most important fac-
tors in the rise of the Welfare Party. The 1980 military coup was staged 
largely against the growing power of the Left in the 1970s. Parties 
were closed down, leaders were sent to jail, and there was a massive 
crackdown on leftist organizations. When the system opened up again 
in 1983, the parties on the Right were able to reorganize. The Left, on 
the other hand, suffered further from both the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the inability to originate a new program that would chal-
lenge free market economics (as did so many social democratic parties 
in Europe). Turkey had discarded import-substitution policies at this 
time and the economy was reorganized for export-oriented growth. 
With state subsidies cut down, the poor became poorer. Whereas the 
vote of the urban poor had been largely for the Republican People’s 
Party in the 1970s, it was transferred to the Welfare Party in the 1980s 
and the 1990s.
The Welfare Party played the dual role of both providing upward 
social mobility for its followers in this new economic milieu and of 
mobilizing the poor. Volunteers from the ranks of devout Muslims, 
especially women, worked for the cause. Through these volunteers, 
the Party provided a network of social welfare help to the poor. The 
Party’s grassroots organizations were active in the squatter sites and 
poor neighborhoods of metropolises, delivering a host of services. This 
assistance ranged from finding people jobs and hospital beds, visiting 
sick patients, taking care of funerals, and attending weddings to dis-
tributing free food and fuel.
At the same time, the Party offered its supporters a wide range of 
opportunities for upward social mobility. It formed a network through 
which recommendations, credits, capital, and contracts went to its fol-
lowers. The Party supporters were employed in municipal govern-
ments and the state bureaucracy. Some municipal and governmental 
contracts went to the entrepreneurs among its ranks. By making use 
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of this network of connections as well as domestic and international 
Muslim capital, the Welfare Party was able to create its own bourgeoi-
sie, including its own intelligentsia and media, within a relatively short 
period of time. The network helped people in the professions or small 
businesses through a chain of references. In this way, it was able to 
integrate people who had been marginalized by the secularist elite into 
centers of power and prestige.
In sum, the success of the Welfare Party had less to do with its 
image as an Islamist party than with its activities in delivering mate-
rial goods. The Welfare Party was successful because it had learned the 
first lesson of democracy, namely, to answer the demands and interests 
of the electorate. However, while doing so, it used the issue of secular-
ism and Islam as a background theme to mobilize a following that was 
sensitive to the issue. This led to a situation in which the Party leader-
ship, now in power, attempted to play a dual role. On the one hand, its 
leaders wanted to attribute to the Party a responsible position on the 
Center-Right. They would be engaged in “normal” politics—business 
as usual, so to speak. On the other hand, however, they had acquired a 
following precisely because the Party was more radical on the issue of 
Islam than the parties on the Center-Right.
Unable to play this dual role, the Welfare leadership found itself 
in the precarious position of polarizing the electorate. The more the 
Party was critized for its discourse on Islam, the more radical the dis-
course became. Media and public scrutiny of the Party were espe-
cially directed at understanding the “real” as opposed to the “hidden” 
intentions of its leadership. Erbakan’s comment that his Party would 
come to power by shedding blood, if necessary, increased the public 
paranoia. The issue was whether the Welfare Party would abide by 
democratic procedures or whether the leadership was hiding its inten-
tions. Discussions began to be centered on the Hitler example and the 
question was increasingly asked whether a democracy should allow 
political parties that would end up destroying it.
In the end, Erbakan was forced to resign from his post as prime 
minister in 1997. This was the result of military pressure but also of 
public protest against the use of religion for political gain and the 
threat it felt about the Party’s growing strength. Subsequently, the Wel-
fare Party was closed by the Constitutional Court, and Erbakan was 
banned from political activity. In retrospect, the major reason behind 
the Welfare Party’s defeat was the failure of its leadership to under-
stand the consensual nature of democracy. It had done well in grasp-
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ing the rationale of democratic politics, namely, the idea of solving 
the day-to-day problems of the electorate. Yet it failed to understand 
the aspect of democracy that rests on compromise and consensus (i.e., 
on moderate politics). In power, the Welfare Party interpreted its 21% 
vote as an arithmetical calculation that equated the percentage of votes 
with a clear mandate. This miscalculation polarized the electorate and 
turned the political arena into a tug-of-war between the secularists 
and the Islamists. In this electrified political atmosphere, its leadership 
became unable to govern.
The legacy of polarized politics left its successor, the Virtue Party 
(VP), little chance to survive. The VP tried to distinguish itself from the 
Welfare Party. It claimed that there was no continuity between the two 
parties. However, it was unable to convince the judiciary that the very 
same people who had been active within Welfare and now formed 
the political cadres of Virtue had changed. Hence, it shared the fate 
of both its predecessors, the National Salvation and the Welfare par-
ties, and was closed down by the Constitutional Court. The movement 
then split into two groups, both of which were organized around new 
parties. The younger generation, known as the “reformists,” founded 
the Justice and Development Party (JDP), which is now in power fol-
lowing a landslide victory in the 2002 elections. The old guard formed 
the Happiness Party (HP) but suffered a major defeat in 2002 with only 
2.4% of the votes.
The Justice and Development Party seems to have studied Welfare’s 
saga well and drawn lessons from it. The JDP leadership cadres have 
been extremely careful to avoid a renewal of the kind of polarization 
that paralyzed the country in the 1990s. Tayyip Erdogan, the present 
prime minister and leader of the JDP, has consistently shied away from 
public questioning or discussion of the role of Islam in Turkish soci-
ety. The Party disclaims its past and positions itself as a “conservative 
democratic party” on the Center-Right. Even a cursory reading of the 
JDP’s program and the legal changes that the Erdogan government has 
accomplished shows the extent to which a political party with roots 
in the Islamist movement has transformed itself. It has consistently 
defended democratic rights and liberties. It sees secularism as a guar-
antor of the individual’s right to believe or not to believe in a faith. It 
is an enthusiastic supporter of Turkey’s entry into the European Union 
and has taken a historic step to solve the Cyprus problem in order to 
achieve EU membership. The JDP is a success story of Turkish democ-
racy.
Macalester International  Vol. 15
42
The history of Islamist political parties in Turkey demonstrates that 
a democratic environment provides a platform for the organization of 
anti-system parties while forcing them to limit their sphere of action 
and moderate their ideology. This is one of the most important les-
sons of the Turkish experience and it has significant implications for 
Islamist movements in other Muslim countries. Turkey’s case shows 
that a democratic system works best to integrate Islamist movements 
into mainstream politics. The interplay of freedom of action and its 
limits in a democracy has a dynamic of its own which leads potentially 
radical movements to play by the rules of the game. In doing so, these 
rules come to define the parameters of both their discourse and prac-
tice. Moreover, this process works both ways. Power centers also learn 
that there are limits to how much they, in turn, can impose the system’s 
definition of rights and freedoms on substantial numbers of people 
who contest them.
“The Building of Modern Turkey,” the subtitle of this article, is 
intentionally in the present continuous tense. The Turkish experience 
shows the difficulties involved in the transformation to modernity 
and democracy. Turkey has been struggling to integrate itself with the 
modern world for two centuries. It has achieved much in the process. 
However, its drive towards modernity in terms of both its economic 
performance and its democratic record is far from complete. Nonethe-
less, it has “taken off’ in the right direction, to use a term that W. W. 
Rustow designated years ago as an important stage in development. 
As such, it stands as an example to the rest of the Muslim world. •
Notes
1. This survey was carried out in 2003 by Ersin Kalaycioglu and Binnaz Toprak. A book 
based on the results is in publication.
2. Thus, for example, the decision taken in the 1980s that legalized free abortions in state 
hospitals and clinics was followed by a fatwa (a religious sanction) by the Director of 
Religious Affairs that argued for its compatibility with Islam.
3. This was the case in France as well, for many years in its history. During the Third 
Republic (1870–1940), for example, not a single individual who regularly attended mass 
was given a cabinet position or was promoted in the army.
4. Ali Çarkoglu and Binnaz Toprak, Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset, TESEV Publica-
tions, 2000.
5. This percentage was down to 14% in the Kalaycioglu-Toprak survey in 2003.
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